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PRAGMATISM AS A THEORY OP TRUTH. 
Pragmatism i s a recent movement i n philosophy i n 
the f i e l d of episteraology, that has a t t r a c t e d world-wide 
a t t e n t i o n . I t i s my purpose i n t h i s paper; f i r s t , to give 
an h i s t o r i c a l sketch of pragmatism, the development of the 
movement; second, to give a statement of what the movement 
i s ; t h i r d , to consider the c r i t i c i s m brought against i t ; 
f o u r t h and i n c o n c l u s i o n , to give a c r i t i c a l estimate of the 
permanent elements i n pragmatism. 
In the January number of the Popular Science Monthly, 
1878, there appeared an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d , "How to Make Our 
n 
Ideas C l e a r " , by C. S. P e i r c e . In t h i s a r t i c l e Mr. P e i r c e 
h e l d t h a t the production of b e l i e f i s the sole f u n c t i o n of 
thought, that these b e l i e f s are h a b i t s or r u l e s of a c t i o n , 
and t h a t our idea of anything c o n s i s t s i n i t s s e n s i b l e e f f e c t s 
upon us. I s h a ^ l now give a b r i e f summary of the main p o i n t s 
i n the paper, since i t i s important f o r our purpose, being 
the seed from which the present modern movement c a l l e d prag-
matism was destined to s p r i n g . 
F i r s t then, the sole f u n c t i o n of thought i s the pro-
d u c t i o n of b e l i e f ; and b e l i e f i n v o l v e s the establishment 
i n our nature of a r u l e of a c t i o n or h a b i t . These r u l e s de-
pend upon the data that we get from the e f f e c t of t h i n g s 
upon us. Once e s t a b l i s h e d , a b e l i e f serves as a new 
s t a r t i n g place f o r f u r t h e r thought; and thus our system of 
2. 
b e l i e f s i s b u i l t up to act as guide to us and to shape our 
f u t u r e conduct. There are ofte n many d i s t i n c t i o n s , that are 
on l y imaginary, drawn between b e l i e f s . They may r e s u l t from 
the inaccuracy of language; i . e., two persons may have 
d i f f e r e n t ideas corresponding to the same word, and i n u s i n g 
t h i s word one w i l l mean one th i n g , w h i l e the other w i l l mean 
something s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t . Thus confusion r e s u l t s . Locke 
spent the whole of '<ook I I I of the Essay Concerning the Human 
Understanding i n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s same t r u t h . Mr. P e i r c e r e -
cognizes the same d i f f i c u l t y , and devotes most of h i s paper 
to c l e a r i n g i t up, i n showing what we mean by an idea and how 
to make our ideas c l e a r . 
Secondly then, what i s the meaning of a given idea? 
Merely t h i s , i t s e f f e c t s upon us. What do we mean by wine? 
Merely t h a t which has c e r t a i n e f f e c t s , e i t h e r d i r e c t or i n -
d i r e c t upon our senses. Our idea of anything i s our i d e a of 
i t s s e n s i b l e e f f e c t s , and we are d e c e i v i n g ourselves i f we 
th i n k we have anything e l s e . I t i s impossible to have an 
idea i n our minds which r e l a t e s to anything but conceited 
s e n s i b l e e f f e c t s of t h i n g s . Iiy c a l l i n g a t h i n g 'hard' we mean 
that i t cannot be scratched by many other substances, here 
again the conception of the q u a l i t y - i n t h i s case, hardness -
l i e s i n i t s conceived e f f e c t s . Weight may be considered i n the 
same way. By c a l l i n g a t h i n g heavy we mean that i n case i t i s 
not supported and there i s no opposing f o r c e , i t w i l l f a l l . 
T h is i s what we mean by weight, and nothing more. I l l u s t r a -
3. 
t i o n s might he m u l t i p l i e d 'ad i n f i n i t u m ' , hut these w i l l 
s u f f i c e . In general then, "Consider what e f f e c t s , which might 
conc e i v a b l y have p r a c t i c a l bearings, we conceive the o b j e c t 
of our conception to have. Then our conception of these e f -
f e c t s i s the whole of our conception of the o b j e c t . " 1 A t h i n g 
i s judged to be t h i s or that according to what i t does, what 
d i f f e r e n c e i t makes i n a c e r t a i n way, i n short,by i t s e f f e c t s . 
We see r e a d i l y that the above has a d i r e c t bearing 
on the problem of t r u t h . There i s great need to i n s p e c t our 
ideas i n the above f a s h i o n before s e t t i n g out on a search f o r 
knowledge. We must know what we mean by g i ^ e n ideas. What 
meaning, what sense i s there i n c o n s i d e r i n g the question of 
the r e a l i t y of things that produce no e f f e c t upon us? Such 
a c o n s i d e r a t i o n would be mere s p e c u l a t i o n , comparable to a 
f a i r y s t o r y , and having no place i n a system of t r u t h . Es-
p e c i a l l y i n the f i e l d of metaphysics must we take care not 
to make such a mistake. I t has happened there too o f t e n a l -
ready. 
This, then, i s the " p r i n c i p l e of P e i r c e , the p r i n -
c i p l e of pragmatism",^ according to Professor James. I t 
di d not, however, create any i n t e r e s t or s t i r up any d i s c u s -
s i o n i n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l world at the time of i t s appearance. 
I t l a y unnoticed u n t i l 1898 when Pr o f e s s o r James i n an address 
before the P h i l o s o p h i c a l Union at the U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a 
1. Pop.Sci.Mon., V o l . X I I , p^93. 
2. Pragmatism, p47. 
discussed i t , made a s p e c i a l a p p l i c a t i o n of i t to r e l i g i o n , 
and launched the movement of pragmatism which has occupied 
a large place i n p h i l o s o p h i c t h i n k i n g up to the present time. 
The movement i s by no means l i m i t e d to our own country, a l -
though i t s leader, Professor James, i s among our number. 
I t i s represented by Mr. S c h i l l e r and others i n England, by 
Mr. P a p i n i and others on the continent. In short i t i s a 
world-wide movement i n philosophy. I t has been discussed 
everywhere i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l c i r c l e s , and a l l the p h i l o s o p h i -
c a l p u b l i c a t i o n s have been crowded w i t h a r t i c l e s concerning 
i t , sometimes considering i t favorably, but very often un-
favorably. 
As the movement spread there were three men who 
might be considered the leaders. These were Messrs. James, 
S c h i l l e r , and Dewey. Professor James came out with what seemed 
to everyone a new c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h . The working of an idea 
c o n s t i t u t e s i t s t r u t h . That i s true which i s u s e f u l , which 
works. Truth depends upon consequences. "There can be no 
d i f f e r e n c e which doesn't make a d i f f er<-nce. m 1 The t r u t h of 
an idea c o n s i s t s i n i t s v e r i f i c a t i o n . You may say, " ' i t i s 
u s e f u l because i t i s tr u e ' , or ' i t i s true because i t i s 
u s e f u l ' . Both these phrases mean e x a c t l y the same thing, 
namely that here i s an idea that gets f u l f i l l e d and can be 
v e r i f i e d . " 2 This i s a rather bald statement of the c r i t e r i o n 
1. Pragmatism, p49.' 
2 « .1 P204 t 
5. 
of t r u t h which Professor James defends. I t w i l l , however, 
be developed and explained f u r t h e r i n the second par t of t h i s 
paper. 
Profe s s o r James does not claim o r i g i n a l i t y i n prag-
matism except i n so f a r as he has u n i f i e d tendencies already 
e x i s t i n g . In f a c t I t h i n k he i s somewhat too modest and 
takes to himself too l i t t l e c r e d i t f o r h i s own c o n t r i b u t i o n . 
He gives Mr. P e i r c e c r e d i t f o r the ' p r i n c i p l e of pragmatism, 1 
'"hen the movement began to spread, however, and became s t a t e d 
i n d e f i n i t e terms, Mr. P e i r c e could not recognize h i s own 
c o n t r i b u t i o n i n i t . At l e a s t he f e l t t h a t h i s pragmatism 
was not that of P r o f e s s o r James, f o r he suggested that h i s 
be c a l l e d 'pragmaticism'. In reading h i s a r t i c l e , "How to 
Make Our Ideas Clear", i t i s hard to t e l l whether he meant 
to include a l l that pragmatism now stands f o r or not. I t i s 
very easy to read i n t o h i s a r t i c l e c e r t a i n p o i n t s which prag-
matism now emphasizes; yet they are not d e f i n i t e l y s t a t e d , 
and i t i s doubtful whether Mr. P e i r c e meant to s t a t e them. 
However, Mr. S c h i l l e r w r i t e s , "Mr. P e i r c e has p r i -
v a t e l y assured me that from the f i r s t he has perceived the 
f u l l consequences of h i s dictum. Hence the formulation of 
the whole pragmatic p r i n c i p l e must be ascribed to him. He 
now, however, c a l l s h i s s p e c i f i c developments of Pragmatism, 
'pragmaticism'? 
1. Pragmatism, p47. 
2. what Pragmatism I s . Monist, V o l . XV, 21. 
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However t h i s may be, i t seems to me that P r o f e s s o r 
James came as near f o r m u l a t i n g the p r i n c i p l e of pragmatism 
i n h i s e a r l i e r works, e. g., The Sentiment of R a t i o n a l i t y 
and other essays, as Mr. P e i r c e d i d . But the question of p r i -
o r i t y does not troub l e Professor James at a l l . He holds that 
there i s nothing new i n pragmatism. His recent book i s en-
t i t l e d , "Pragmatism, a New Name f o r Some Old Ways of Thinking, 
In i t he says, "There i s a b s o l u t e l y nothing new i n the prag-
matic method. Socrates was an adept at i t . A r i s t o t l e used 
i t m e t h o d i c a l l y . Locke, Berkeley, and Hume made momentous 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s to t r u t h by i t s means. Shadworth Hodgson keeps 
i n s i s t i n g that r e a l i t i e s are only what they are 'known as'. 
But these forerunners of pragmatism used i t i n fragments: 
they were a prelude only. Not u n t i l our time has i t general-
i s e d i t s e l f , become conscious of a u n i v e r s a l m i s s i o n , pre-
tended to a conquering d e s t i n y . " 1 
Again i n the same chapter, " I t i s evident that the 
term a p p l i e s i t s e l f c o n v i e n t l y to a number of tendencies t h a t 
h i t h e r t o have lacked a c o l l e c t i v e name, and that i t has 
» come to s t a y . ' " 2 
Mr. S c h i l l e r , the leader of the movement i n England, 
has agreed w i t h P r o f e s s o r James throughout i n the develop-
ment of pragmatism. He has, however, emphasized a d i f f e r e n t 
phase of the movement, and has c a l l e d h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n human-
1. Pragmatism, p50. 
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ism. "Human i n t e r e s t i s v i t a l to the existence of 
t r u t h : to say that a t r u t h has consequences and what has none 
i s meaningless, means that i t has a bearing on some human 
i n t e r e s t . I t s consequences must be consequences tjo some one 
f o r some purpose." 1 
I n t e r e s t s , emotions, v o l i t i o n s , and a s p i r a t i o n s , 
have to be considered i n t h i s problem. Truths are man-made; 
they are not trancendental, absolute a f f a i r s . They are our 
own s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n of the data we get from experience. HUT 
man d e s i r e s , motives, e t c . , determine l a r g e l y what t h i s sys-
tem of t r u t h s i s to be. This p o s i t i o n i s not s u b j e c t i v i s m , 
as i t has been accused of being. I t recognizes r e s i s t i n g 
f a c t o r s i n our experience, but i t holds that we cannot sepa-
rate out such f a c t o r s from the human c o n t r i b u t i o n . 
Mr. Dewey's name has u s u a l l y been connected w i t h 
the 'instrumental' view of t r u t h . Ideas are true i n so f a r 
as they help us to systematize our experience. He attacked 
the problem from the genetic standpoint, and h i s "Studies i n 
L o g i c a l Theory" had a great i n f l u e n c e i n the e a r l y statement 
of pragmatism. In the main h i s p o s i t i o n seemed to agree 
e n t i r e l y w i t h t h a t of Messrs. James and S c h i l l e r . Recently,* 
however, he has announced c e r t a i n p o i n t s of d i f f e r e n c e , and 
these w i l l be considered i n the t h i r d p a r t of t h i s paper. 
1. Studies i n Humanism, p5. 
2. J o u r n a l of Philosophy, V o l . V, 4. 
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We s h a l l now proceed to a more d e t a i l e d statement and 
explanation of what pragmatism i s . F i r s t , i t i s a theory of 
t r u t h and an outgrowth of the e m p i r i c a l school, though not 
a statement of empiricism as we s h a l l see l a t e r . I t i s l a r g e -
l y the method of modern science extended and a p p l i e d to a l l 
f i e l d s of i n q u i r y . There i s no reason why there should he 
d i f f e r e n t methods and d i f f e r e n t t e s t s f o r t r u t h i n the d i f -
f e r e n t f i e l d s . In a l l of them, science, philosophy, r e l i g i o n , 
or what-not, men are i n search of knowledge. The pragmatists 
then suggest a s i n g l e c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h i n a l l of these f i e l d s , 
v i z . , the w o r k a b i l i t y of the i d e a i n question. 
Ostwald, the great German chemist and philosopher, 
i n h i s correspondence w i t h Professor James wrote, " A l l re-
a l i t i e s i n f l u e n c e our p r a c t i c e , and that i n f l u e n c e i s t h e i r 
meaning f o r us. I am accustomed to put questions to my 
c l a s s e s i n t h i s way: In what respects would the world be d i f -
f e r e n t i f t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e or that were true? I f I can f i n d 
nothing that would become d i f f e r e n t , then the a l t e r n a t i v e 
has no sense." 1 In other words, one a l t e r n a t i v e would mean 
the same as the other, since there would be no d i f f e r e n c e 
accruing from e i t h e r t h i s or that ones being true. 
Again Ostwald i n speaking of a controversy among 
chemists concerning the inner c o n s t i t u t i o n of bodies c a l l e d 
1. Pragmatism, p48 
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tautoraerous s a y s , " I t would never have begun i f the combatants 
had asked themselves what p a r t i c u l a r experimental f a c t could 
have been made d i f f e r e n t by one or the other view being cor-
r e c t . For i t would then have appeared that no d i f f e r e n c e 
of f a c t could p o s s i b l y ensue; and the q u a r r e l was as u n r e a l 
as i f , t h e o r i z i n g i n p r i m i t i v e times about the r a i s i n g of 
dough by yeast, one p a r t y should have invoked a 'brownie', 
w h i l e another i n s i s t e d on an ' e l f as the true cause of the 
phenomenon. 
In the P r i n c i p l e s of Psychology,^ by P r o f e s s o r 
James appears the f o l l o w i n g passage which i s d e c i d e d l y prag-
matic, though w r i t t e n long before the pragmatic movement, 
s t r i c t l y s o - c a l l e d , had begun: "What we experience, what comes 
before us, i s a chaos of fragmentary impressions i n t e r r u p t -
i n g each other; what we t h i n k i s an a b s t r a c t system of hypo-
t h e t i c a l data and laws. This s o r t of s c i e n t i f i c a l g e b r a , 
l i t t l e as i t immediately resembles the r e a l i t y given to us, 
turns out ( s t r a n g e l y enough) a p p l i c a b l e to i t . That i s , i t 
y i e l d s expressions which, at given p l a c e s and times, can be 
t r a n s l a t e d i n t o r e a l v a l u e s , or i n t e r p r e t e d as d e f i n i t e por-
t i o n s of the chaos that f a l l s upon our sense. I t becomes 
thus a p r a c t i c a l guide to our expectations as w e l l as a the-
o r e t i c d e l i g h t . But I do not see how anyone w i t h a sense 
f o r the f a c t s can p o s s i b l y c a l l our systems immediate r e s u l t s 
1. Pragmatism, p49. 
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of 'experience' i n the or d i n a r y sense. Every s c i e n t i f i c con-
c e p t i o n i s i n the f i r s t instance a spontaneous v a r i a t i o n i n 
someone's "brain. For one that proves u s e f u l and a p p l i c a b l e 
there are a thousand that p e r i s h through t h e i r worthlessness. 
.... ' S c i e n t i f i c conceptions must prove t h e i r worth by being 
' v e r i f i e d ' . This t e s t , however, i s the cause of t h e i r p r e s e r -
v a t i o n , not of t h e i r p r o duction." 
A g a i n , l a t e r i n h i s "Pragmatism", " I t i s ... as i f 
r e a l i t y were made up of ether, atoms or e l e c t r o n s , but we 
mustn't t h i n k so l i t e r a l l y . The term 'energy' doesn't even 
pretend to stand f o r anything ' o b j e c t i v e ' . I t i s o n l y a way 
of measuring the surface of phenomena so as to s t r i n g t h e i r 
changes on a simple f o r m u l a . " 1 
Theories i n science are true only i n so f a r as they 
meet and systematize the f a c t s , the data that we have. This 
i s what c o n s t i t u t e s t h e i r t r u t h . This i s t h e i r meaning, and 
the o n l y r e a l meaning they can have. They are instruments, 
made by man from h i s data accumulated through h i s past ex-
pe r i e n c e , and t h e i r purpose i s to serve man as a guide i n 
h i s f u t u r e experience. H i s t o r y has shown us that new data 
are c o n s t a n t l y coming i n t o view as the r e s u l t of s c i e n t i f i c 
research, e t c . , and these often force us e i t h e r to abandon 
or remodel our t h e o r i e s , u s u a l l y the l a t t e r . The Ptolemaic 
astronomy had to be given a thorough overhauling r e s u l t i n g 
1. p216. 
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i n the Copernican astronomy. Present day s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s 
are being m o d i f i e d and remodelled to account f o r the new data 
which comes to us day by day. Only a short time ago the ad-
vent of radium threatened to overturn our fundamental concep-
t i o n of the conservation of energy. Ramsay i n f i t t i n g t h i s 
new i n t r u d e r i n t o the o l d t h e o r i e s , however, saved the p r i n -
c i p l e o f conservation of energy, because i t was so u s e f u l 
and fundamental i n our other t h e o r i e s . However, he had to 
extend and reshape our o l d ideas of energy. 
And so i t i s w i t h a l l our t h e o r i e s . They are i n -
strumental. They are not answers to p u z z l e s . They are not 
f i n a l s o l u t i o n s , but they are our s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n s of past 
data to serve as guides and schedules f o r more work. We 
have no assurance that tomorrow w i l l not b r i n g us new data 
that w i l l n e c c e s i t a t e a reshaping of our theory. In the 
meantime i t i s t r u e , f o r i t serves to systematize a l l the 
data we have. K a r l y i n the h i s t o r y of science when men had 
j u s t begun to formulate laws, they were so c a r r i e d away by 
t h e i r c l e a r n e s s , t h e i r u s e f u l n e s s , e t c . , t h a t they b e l i e v e d 
they had discovered something absolute. "But as science has 
developed f a r t h e r , " says P r o f e s s o r James, "the n o t i o n has 
gained ground that most, perhaps a l l of our laws are o n l y 
approximations. The laws themselves, moreover, have grown 
so numerous that there i s no counting them; and so many r i -
v a l f o r m u l a t i o n s are proposed i n a l l branches of science 
that i n v e s t i g a t o r s have become accustomed to the n o t i o n t h a t 
12. 
no theory i s a b s o l u t e l y a t r a n s c r i p t of r e a l i t y , hut that any-
one of them may from some point of view he u s e f u l . Their 
great use i s to summarize o l d f a c t s and to lead to new ones. 
They are only a man-made language r,»as some one c a l l s them, 
i n which we w r i t e our repo r t s of nature; and languages, as 
i s w e l l known, t o l e r a t e much choice of expression and many 
d i a l e c t s . . . . Ideas (which themselves are hut part of our 
experience) become true j u s t i n so f a r as they help us to get 
i n t o s a t i s f a c t o r y r e l a t i o n w i t h other p a r t s of our experience, 
to summarize them and get about among them by conceptual 
short-cuts instead of f o l l o w i n g the interminable succession 
of p a r t i c u l a r phenomena. h 1 
And so when new data are presented to us, which 
n e c e s s i t a t e a change i n our o l d stock of t r u t h s , we make 
such changes as are a b s o l u t e l y necessary, but preserve the 
o l d t r u t h s w i t h a minimum of m o d i f i c a t i o n . L o y a l t y , as f a r 
as i t i s p o s s i b l e , to o l d t r u t h i s one of the fundamental 
elements i n the pragmatic temperament. I f one i s not thus 
l o y a l he i s apt to cut himself o f f from past experience, and 
los e a great amount of valuable data. There would be no ad-
vantage to gain by c u t t i n g loose e n t i r e l y from o l d t h e o r i e s . 
Instead there would be a decided disadvantage, and hence we 
are l o a t h to part from our o l d t h e o r i e s which have served us 
so w e l l i n the past. The r e s u l t i s that we reshape them w i t h 
1. Pragmatism, p56. 
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as l i t t l e change as p o s s i b l e , j u s t enough to include our new 
f a c t s i n the system. I f two r e v i s i o n s of the theory have 
been made, and each meets the new data as "well as the other, 
one i s r e a l l y as true as the other. But i n science we always, 
under these c o n d i t i o n s , choose the simpler of the two, and 
c a l l i t the true theory, not because i t meets the new f a c t s 
b e t t e r , but because i t i s simpler, and i t would be poor t a s t e 
to choose the more complex. 
I t i s not, however, a p e r f e c t l y easy matter to 
f i n d even one theory that w i l l meet a l l the f a c t s presented 
and not c l a s h w i t h other already accepted t r u t h s . Much l e s s 
i s i t o f t e n p o s s i b l e to f i n d two or more t h e o r i e s that meet 
the f a c t s , that work e q u a l l y w e l l . I t i s true i t sometimes 
happens, but i t i s by no means a common occurrence. To work 
means to mediate between a l l previous t r u t h s and the given 
new data which experience has brought us. O r d i n a r i l y t h a t 
part of a proposed hypothesis that seems to work i s allowed 
to s u r vive and be tested f a r t h e r , while the pa r t that i s use-
l e s s i s discarded. By t h i s process of s e l e c t i o n a s u i t a b l e 
theory, one that works i n f i t t i n g the new f a c t s i n t o the o l d 
t r u t h s i s at l a s t found. 
I n determining the t r u t h or f a l s i t y of a conception 
then, we have to consider always, does i t meet the f a c t s , 
does i t systematize the data we have re c e i v e d from experience, 
does i t work? This i s the t e s t . Science adds another, l e s s 
important but nevertheless a f a c t o r , i s i t the simplest theory 
14. 
t h a t w i l l systematize the given data? 
Truth i s not merely a great number of f a c t s , a great 
mass of data. These are not t r u e , they simply are. They 
are the given only, and as such cannot be considered as t r u t h . 
T r u t h i s what we say about them; i t i s our reducing them to 
system. As P r o f e s s o r James puts i t , "Truths emerge from 
f a c t s ; biit they dip forward i n t o f a c t s again and add to them; 
which f a c t s again create or r e v e a l new t r u t h (the word i s 
i n d i f f e r e n t ) and so on i n d e f i n i t e l y . The f a c t s themselves 
meanwhile are not t r u e . They simply are. Truth i s the func-
t i o n of the b e l i e f s t h a t s t a r t and terminate among them."1 
F a i l u r e to grasp t h i s p o i n t has been the cause of much of the 
misunderstanding i n regard to pragmatism. 
So much f o r the pragmatist c r i t e r i o n i n the f i e l d 
of s c i e n c e . But i t i s not l i m i t e d to s c i e n c e . Pragmatism 
recommends i t as a u n i v e r s a l and the o n l y c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h , 
a p p l i c a b l e to any and every f i e l d of i n q u i r y . I t recommends 
i t to philosophy, and holds that science and philosophy 
should not be separated by so wide a gap as they now are. 
S c i e n t i f i c t r u t h and p h i l o s o p h i c t r u t h are not such e n t i r e l y 
d i f f e r e n t v a r i e t i e s t h a t they r e q u i r e separate c r i t e r i a . 
Hence, pragmatism r e v o l t s a g ainst mere s p e c u l a t i o n i n p h i l o s o -
phy, a g a i n s t those a b s t r a c t metaphysical systems which make 
no d i f f e r e n c e to our w o r l d of experience, which have no 
1. Pragmatism, p225. 
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"bearing whatever upon our data and do not serve to Systematize 
or e x p l a i n them, which are i n short useless from every point 
of view unless perhaps i t "be to serve as a sort of mental 
gymnastics. In s e t t l i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l disputes one must 
apply the same te s t that he applies i n s e t t l i n g disputes con-
cerning s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s . What d i f f e r e n c e w i l l accrue 
from t h i s or that a l t e r n a t i v e being true? 
" I t i s astonishing to see how many p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
disputes collapse i n t o i n s i g n i f i c a n c e the moment you subject 
them to t h i s simple t e s t of t r a c i n g a concrete consequence. 
There can be no d i f f e r e n c e anywhere that doesn't make a d i f -
ference elsewhere - no d i f f e r e n c e i n abstract t r u t h that 
doesn't express i t s e l f i n a di f f e r e n c e of concrete f a c t and 
i n conduct subsequent upon that f a c t , imposed on somebody, 
somehow, somewhere, somewhen. The whole fu n c t i o n of p h i l -
osophy ought to be to f i n d out what d e f i n i t e d i f f e r e n c e i t 
w i l l make to you and me, at d e f i n i t e i n s t a n t s of our l i f e , 
i f t h i s world-formula or that world-formula be the true one." 1 
In the f i e l d of metaphysics i n the past, p h i l o s o -
phers have been too prone to spin out t h e i r systems without 
enough a t t e n t i o n to the given data. They have often refused 
to be hampered by such data. The r e s u l t may be a ver;/ beau-
t i f u l system, but i t i s very doubtful whether i t has any 
r i g h t to the name of t r u t h . Too often have the s o l u t i o n s 
of the metaphysical problems been merely verbal s o l u t i o n s . 
1. Pragmatism, p49. 
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Pragmatism proposes to improve these conditions, and r a i s e 
philosophy to a higher place by applying i t s c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h 
to p h i l o s o p n i c a l problems. 
We have already seen i n the above the humanistic 
tinge i n the pragmatist's theory of t r u t h . Truth i s not an 
absolute and f i n a l something. Truth i s a human i n s t i t u t i o n . 
Truth i n any given f i e l d of i n q u i r y i s merely our own ab-
s t r a c t i o n s from the f a c t s about us, from the data given. 
I t i s merely a useful summarizing phrase. What our abstrac-
t i o n s are to be i s determined l a r g e l y by our own temperament, 
by our own motives, our s a t i s f a c t i o n s , our de s i r e s , etc. 
We are reminded of t h i s every day. Men are d i f f e r e n t i n tem-
perament, and wi t h t h i s d i f f e r e n c e we f i n d another and cor-
responding difference i n t h e i r respective stocks of t r u t h s . 
Which i s the truer? The r a t i o n a l i s t w i l l say we must ignore 
these f a c t o r s . The pragmatist, however, holds that the reason 
we have so much disagreement and so many quarrels about the 
t r u t h of t h i s or that p r o p o s i t i o n , i s because we have here-
tofore ignored these f a c t o r s . The only way to s e t t l e these 
d i f f e r e n c e s and clear up the s i t u a t i o n i s to recognize tem-
perament, the human element, and allow i t to -count f o r so 
much. I t i s a r e a l f a c t o r , and must be considered. 
Truth depends upon purpose. As Mr. S c h i l l e r i n -
s i s t s , "The most e s s e n t i a l feature of pragmatism may w e l l 
seem i t s i n s i s t e n c e upon the f a c t that a l l mental l i f e ijs 
p u r p o s i v e . n l 
1. Studies i n Humanism, plO, 
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In every human s i t u a t i o n there i s a purpose, and 
t r u t h has reference to the f u l f i l l m e n t of t h i s purpose. 
Hence, as the purposes of i n d i v i d u a l s d i f f e r , so w i l l t h e i r 
t r u t h c o n t r i b u t i o n . Our b e l i e f s , i n whatever l i n e , are 
hypotheses to be tested by the on-going of fixture experience. 
They are a l l analogous to s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses. A l l are 
founded on f a i t h based l a r g e l y on what we d e s i r e . They are 
a l l t e s t e d a l i k e by t h e i r consequences, by whether they serve 
us f o r the purpose intended or not. 
The human element then has a place i n the consider-
a t i o n of the problem of truth.. Mr. S c h i l l e r i n h i s enthusi-
asm almost seems to t h i n k i t deserves the whole p l a c e . He 
does, however, recognize r e s i s t i n g f a c t o r s . We may conclude 
from the above that there i s a c e r t a i n sense i n which we 
human i n d i v i d u a l s make r e a l i t y . This sounds very queer at 
f i r s t , and i t has brought f l o o d s of c r i t i c i s m upon the prag-
m a t i s t s . They do not, however, hold that we are the sole 
c o n s t r u c t o r s of r e a l i t y . We only cooperate i n the making. 
There are r e s i s t i n g f a c t o r s . These are given us i n our ex-
perience data, and we have not the power to a l t e r them to 
s u i t our t a s t e . But we do have power to put these data i n -
to shape, to systematize them. This i s what we do; and the 
f i n i s h e d product, t r u t h , a human c o n s t r u c t i o n , i s used as a 
guide f o r us i n future experience, making t h i s experience 
d i f f e r e n t from what i t would have been without such a guide. 
This i s what the pragmatists mean by our making r e a l i t y , and 
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t h i s i s a l l they mean. I t i s absurd to t r y to read i n t o t h e i r 
d o c t r i n e the f a c t that we can r u l e out a l l r e s i s t i n g f a c t o r s 
and change our sense experience to something other than what 
i t i s by some sort of magic. Yet t h i s i s what some of t h e i r 
c r i t i c s seem to be t r y i n g to do. 
I t has perhaps already been surmized what the 
p r a g m a t i s t 1 s a t t i t u d e toward what has been called, a p r i o r i 
t r u t h s , toward axioms and our stock of u n i v e r s a l l y accepted 
t r u t h s w i l l be. These appear more c e r t a i n or tr u e r s i i v p l y 
because they have been more u s e f u l to us i n systematizing 
our experience. But even they are not f i n a l . We f e e l l i k e 
c o n s i d e r i n g them so merely because they have worked so w e l l . 
We have never known them to " f a i l us. They served our ances-
t o r s e q u a l l y w e l l , and i n f a c t were handed down to us by 
them. We f e e l confident that there can never be a break, 
that these t r u t h s are a p r i o r i and c e r t a i n , and that they 
w i l l never f a i l us, merely because they never have f a i l e d 
us i n the past. We f o r g e t to consider t h e i r source. We 
ignore the f a c t that they too i n the l a s t r e s o r t are human 
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s or our own p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , dependent upon 
the g i ven i n experience. They have been handed down from 
generation to generation f o r ages past, and we have no re-
cord of course of t h e i r f i r s t appearance. We only know t h a t 
they have s u r v i v e d , and that has been p o s s i b l e o n l y because 
they have been of use to us. "'e needed them, and there 
was nothing e l s e a v a i l a b l e that would serve the purpose 
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"better. We have no assurance, however, that tomorrow may 
not b r i n g us new experience data that w i l l compel us to mod-
i f y even these fundamental conceptions of ours. I c i t e d 
above a case i n which our conception of the conservation of 
energy was s e r i o u s l y threatened by the appearance of radium. 
Our conceptions must be made to f i t our. data, 
not our data to f i t conceptions. In case of new data, how-
ever, we always a l t e r the o l d conception as l i t t l e as pos-
s i b l e . Thus the development of these fundamental conceptions 
i s slow enough to be almost i m p e r c e p t i b l e , and we f e e l more 
l i k e bowing down before them than c r i t i c i z i n g them. Tkey 
are the r e s u l t s of a great e v o l u t i o n a r y movement i n which 
they have survived because of t h e i r usefulness i n meeting 
t h e ' f a c t s , w h i l e r . i l l i o n s of other conceptions have disap-
peared because they were l e s s u s e f u l and e f f i c i e n t i n meeting 
the f a c t s of experience. 
P r o f e s s o r James c a l l s these fundamental ways of 
t h i n k i n g of ours and t h i s stock of - l e t us say p e t r i f i e d 
truths,'common sense', using the term of course i n a tech-
n i c a l sense. "Our fundamental ways of t h i n k i n g about things 
are d i s c o v e r i e s of exceedingly remote ancestors, which have 
been able to preserve themselves throughout the experience 
of a l l subsequent time..... 
"When we look back, and speculate how the common-
sense c a t e g o r i e s may have achieved t h e i r wonderful supremacy, 
no reason appears why i t may not have been by a process 
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j u s t l i k e that by which the conceptions due to Democritus, 
B e r k e l e y , or Darwin, achieved t h e i r s i m i l a r triumphs i n more 
recent times. In other words they may have been success-
f u l l y discovered by p r e h i s t o r i c geniuses whose names the 
ni g h t of a n t i q u i t y has covered up; they may ha^e been v e r i -
f i e d by the immediate f a c t s of experience which they f i r s t 
f i t t e d ; and then from f a c t to f a c t and from man to man they 
may have spread, u n t i l a l l language rested on them and we 
are now incapable of t h i n k i n g i n any other terms. Such a 
view would o n l y f o l l o w the r u l e that has proved elsewhere 
so f e r t i l e , of assuming the vast and remote to conform to 
the laws of formation that we can observe at work i n the 
small and near." 
The pragmatist has a very d e f i n i t e q u a r r e l ;we see, 
w i t h the r a t i o n a l i s t o# these p o i n t s . He would hold that 
a p r i o r i t r u t h s are not c e r t a i n . They have to run the same 
g a u n t l e t and face the same t e s t that other t r u t h s do. They 
are not a c l a s s of t r u t h s separate and d i s t i n c t from other 
t r u t h s . They are merely assumptions, p o s t u l a t e s , presup-
p o s i t i o n s , w i t h which we begin to b u i l d up our system of 
t r u t h s , and they too must be subjected to the pragmatic 
t e s t . 
May not the r a t i o n a l i s t have taken too much as 
a p r i o r i ? And i f so, why should we take anything as a p r i o r i , 
1. Pragmatism, ppl70-182 
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as a closed question? Truths seem more and more s e l f - e v i d e n t 
the more we use them, the more we "become acquainted w i t h them. 
Acquaintance "breeds assurance of t h e i r t r u t h , and makes us 
s 
consider them absolute and f i n a l , makes us place them on the 
i n f a l l i b l e l i s t . itxperience shows us t h i s every day. But 
where s h a l l we draw the l i n e ? The pragmatist says there 
can be no l i n e . Perhaps the data from experience are not 
a l l i n yet. Indeed, we have every reason to be l i e v e they 
are not. With i t s a d d i t i o n even our most absolute and sa-
cred formulas may have to be a l t e r e d . We have no assurance 
as to what data tomorrow may b r i n g us. Hence the r a t i o n a l -
i s t must not be too sure about the absolute character of 
h i s t r u t h s . His statement concerning them should be hypo-
t h e t i c a l - i f the data are a l l i n , t h i s conclusion i s cer-
t a i n on the b a s i s that the p o s t u l a t e s , which we must make 
at the beginning, hold. out i f some new f a c t appears and 
upsets our system, we must make enough a l t e r a t i o n i n i t to 
include t h i s new f a c t . Truths cannot be f i n a l . Systems 
cannot be cl o s e d , f o r we have no absolute assurance that 
the f u t u r e has not i n store f o r us something that may neces-
s i t a t e an a l t e r a t i o n i n our system. Hence,our systems 
must remain open f o r a l l time. 
The u n i v e r s a l i t y of law i n nature i s a conception 
that has a place i n everybody's stock of t r u t h s . Science 
would be h e l p l e s s without i t . In f a c t p r e d i c t i o n would be 
a b s o l u t e l y impossible without i t . Yet i t i s not such an 
absolute t r u t h as some of us would l i k e to consider i t . 
I t i s a human g e n e r a l i z a t i o n based upon human experience. 
The pragmatist considers i t as merely an assumption, a pos-
t u l a t e , upon which our knowledge of the world about us de-
pends. We f i n d a great deal of u n i f o r m i t y i n the phenomena 
about us. We also f i n d very often a seeming l a c k of u n i -
f o r m i t y . We then set about to account f o r t h i s discrepancy, 
and to prove our hypothesis by f i n d i n g some other f a c t o r 
that has operated to upset things. Thus we must be con-
t i n u a l l y defending our hypothesis that nature i s uniform. 
In f a c t nature may be only approximately uniform. Sone u n i -
f o r m i t y we know there i s , but the p r o p o s i t i o n that nature 
i s uniform i s a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n based upon p r o b a b i l i t y . 
When we take t h i s fundamental t r u t h down from i t s pedestal, 
we must also take down a l l those that are dependent upon i t . 
They are a l l true j u s t i n so f a r as they work and are use-
f u l i n reducing our data to a system and preparing us to 
meet the f u t u r e . 
This i s the pragmatist's a t t i t u d e toward a p r i o r i 
t r u t h s , axioms, and that large body of u n i v e r s a l l y accepted 
t r u t h s which include a l l our fundamental ways of t h i n k i n g . 
Having had great s u r v i v a l value, they have o u t l i v e d t h e i r 
l e s s fortunate brother conceptions, and have come down to 
us as the her i t a g e of our f o r e f a t h e r s . They have become 
p e t r i f i e d , and we are apt to set them o f f i n a c l a s s by 
themselves as absolute and i n f a l l i b l e and ignore t h e i r r e a l 
nature and o r i g i n . For a f u l l e r and completer statement 
and a defense of t h i s p o s i t i o n , I r e f e r the reader to Mr. 
S c h i l l e r ' s "Axioms as P o s t u l a t e s " and "Humanism", and 
P r o f e s s o r James' chapters on'Common Sense' and'Humanism' 
i n "Pragmatism". 
I t i s f a i r l y c l e a r now what the pragmatist's con-
c e p t i o n of t r u t h i s . But before passing on to the next 
p a r t , the c r i t i c i s m that the movement has brought upon i t -
s e l f , l e t us make a f i n a l e f f o r t to c l e a r up the s i t u a t i o n 
and make sure that we know d e f i n i t e l y what pragmatism i s . 
Truth has long since been defined as agreement 
w i t h r e a l i t y . Everyone accepts t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , the prag-
m a t i s t i n c l u d e d . But the controversy comes i n i n determin-
i n g what we mean by t h i s 'agreement » and ' r e a l i t y ' . The 
pragmatist holds that he has given the o n l y tenable account 
of what such agreement i s . I s h a l l here quote f r e e l y from 
P r o f e s s o r James as he i s the leader of the movement and ought 
to be able to speak w i t h a u t h o r i t y concerning i t , i f anyone 
can. 
" R e a l i t i e s mean .... e i t h e r concrete f a c t s , or ab-
anj rt/gtia ts 
s t r a c t kinds of thing^perceived i n t u i t i v e l y between them. 
They furthermore and t h i r d l y mean, as things that new ideas, tfoun 
must no l e s s take account of, the whole body of oi#rrtruths 
already i n our possession. But now what does agreement with 
such t h r e e f o l d r e a l i t i e s mean?.... 
"To agree i n the widest sense w i t h a r e a l i t y 
o n l y me&n to be guided s t r a i g h t up to i t or in t o i t s 
surroundings, or to be put i n t o such working touch w i t h i t 
M l£ handle e i t h e r i t or_ something connected w l t h i t b e t t e r 
than i f we disagreed. B e t t e r e i t h e r I n t e l l e o t u a l l y or prac-
t i c a l l y ' . And often agreement w i l l onlv mean the negative 
f a c t that nothing c o n t r a d i c t o r y from the quarter of that 
r e a l i t y comes to i n t e r f e r e w i t h the way i n which our ideas 
guide us elsewhere. To copy a r e a l i t y i s indeed one very 
important way of agreeing w i t h i t , but i t i s f a r from be-
ing e s s e n t i a l . The e s s e n t i a l thing i s the process of be-
ing guided. Any idea that helps us to deal, whether prac-
t i c a l l y or i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , w i t h e i t h e r the r e a l i t y or i t s 
belongings, that doesn't entangle our progress with f r u s -
t r a t i o n s , that f i t s , i n f a c t , and adapts our l i f e to the 
r e a l i t y ' s whole s e t t i n g , w i l l agree s u f f i c i e n t l y to meet 
the requirement. I t w i l l hold true of that r e a l i t y 
"Agreement thus turns out to be e s s e n t i a l l y an 
a f f a i r of l e a d i n g - l e a d i n g that i s useful because i t i s i n t o 
quarters that contain objects that are important. True 
ideas lead us i n t o u s e f u l verbal and conceptual quarters 
as w e l l as d i r e c t l y up to u s e f u l sensible t e r m i n i . They 
lead to consistency, s t a b i l i t y , and flo w i n g human i n t e r c o u r s e . 
They l e a d away from e x c e n t r i c i t y and i s o l a t i o n , from f o i l e d 
and barren t h i n k i n g . The untrammelled f l o w i n g of the lead-
in g process, i t s general freedom from c l a s h and c o n t r a d i c -
t i o n , passes f o r i t s i n d i r e c t v e r i f i c a t i o n ; but a l l roads 
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l e a d to Home, and i n the end and e v e n t u a l l y , a l l true pro-
cesses must l e a d to the face of d i r e c t l y v e r i f y i n g s e n s i -
b l e experiences somewhere, which somebody's ideas have 
c o p i e d . m 1 
Although the purpose of a l l the above has been 
to d e f i n e t r u t h , i t may be w e l l to quote here some con-
c i s e phrases and d e f i n i t i o n s of t r u t h from the pragmatic 
standpoint. "The t r u e , to put i t b r i e f l y , i s only the ex-
pedient i n the way of our t h i n k i n g , j u s t as the r i g h t i s 
o n l y the expedient i n the way of our behaving. Expedient 
i n almost any f a s h i o n ; and expedient i n the long run and 
on the whole of course; f o r what meets e x p e d i e n t l y a l l the 
experience i n s i g h t wont n e c e s s a r i l y meet a l l f a r t h e r ex-
perience e q u a l l y s a t i s f a c t o r i l y , experience, as we know, 
has ways of b o i l i n g over, and making us c o r r e c t our pre-
sent formulas. The ' a b s o l u t e l y ' t r u e , meaning what no .far-
t h e r experience w i l l ever a l t e r , i s that i d e a l v a n i s h i n g -
p o i n t towards which we imagine that a l l our temporary t r u t h s 
w i l l someday converge." f c 
Again, "True ideas are those that we can a s s i m i l a t e , 
v a l i d a t e , corroborate and v e r i f y . F alse ideas are those 
t h a t we can not Truth happens to an idea. I t becomes 
t r u e , i s made true by events. I t s v e r i t y is. i n f a c t an e-
1. Pragmatism, pp212-215. 
2. " p222. 
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vent,a process: the process namely of i t s v e r i f y i n g i t s e l f , 
i t s v e r i - f i c a t i o n . I t s v a l i d i t y i s the process of i t s 
v a l i d - a t i o n . 33ut what do the words v e r i f i c a t i o n and v a l i d a -
t i o n themselves p r a g m a t i c a l l y mean? They again s i g n i f y cer-
t a i n p r a c t i c a l consequences of the v e r i f i e d and v a l i d a t e d 
i d e a . u l 
We rriay say then, that t r u t h i s "a c o l l e c t i v e name 
f o r v e r i f i c a t i o n processes" , and to work p e r f e c t l y and com-
p l e t e l y i s v e r i f i c a t i o n . You are not permitted, however, 
to l i m i t t r u t h to what you y o u r s e l f have v e r i f i e d . Not on l y 
v e r i f i c a t i o n hut also v e r i f i a h i l i t y i s to he the t e s t . 
Truth i s s o c i a l i n chara c t e r , and a great p a r t of our t r u t h s 
have not been v e r i f i e d by us d i r e c t l y . We accept some one 
e l s e ' s v e r i f i c a t i o n , and put them on our l i s t . We use them, 
and f i n d t h at they are e n t i r e l y s a t i s f a c t o r y . They work 
f o r us i n so f a r as we need them; but we have only i n d i r e c t 
v e r i f i c a t i o n of them; we have only v e r i f l a b i l i t y . We could 
put them through a l l the t e s t s i f we so d e s i r e d , but wè do 
not. 
Science i s doing t h i s c o n t i n u a l l y . The whole 
f i e l d o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s d i v i d e d o f f i n t o s e c t i o n s ; e.g., 
chemistry, p h y s i c s , zoology, geology, e t c . They have i n -
augurated here as w e l l as i n the i n d u s t r i a l f i e l d the scheme 
of the d i v i s i o n of l a b o r . The chemist stays i n h i s own 
1. Pragmatism, p201. 
2. " P21S. 
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corner, and l i m i t s h i s v e r i f i c a t i o n processes to that f i e l d . 
So w i t h the p h y s i c i s t , z o o l o g i s t , g e o l o g i s t , e t c . , and each 
one accepts the v e r i f i c a t i o n processes of the other. Thus 
very many of our stock of t r u t h s have not been d i r e c t l y 
v e r i f i e d by us. We trade on each others* t r u t h s . But each 
one of them i n the l a s t a n a l y s i s has been v e r i f i e d by some 
one, and i t i s upon such d i r e c t v e r i f i c a t i o n s that t r u t h 
r e s t s . 
The scope of pragmatism i s " f i r s t a method; and 
second, a genetic theory of what i s meant by t r u t h . 1 , 1 I t 
i s not a philosophy, and i t stands f o r no p a r t i c u l a r r e s u l t s . 
There are many who seem to be w i l l i n g to accept pragmatism 
as method, but who balk at the theory of t r u t h . S c i e n t i s t s 
g e n e r a l l y agree that there.must be a d i f f e r e n c e i n f a c t 
to make i t allowable to change a theory. They agree that a 
t h i n g i s judged by us e n t i r e l y by i t s e f f e c t s upon us. "We 
w i l l use your methods," they say, " i n our search f o r t r u t h . 
Your c r i t e r i a of usefulness, w o r k a b i l i t y , e t c . , w i l l help 
us i n the d i r e c t i o n of t r u t h , but they are not themselves 
t r u t h . " Hence they very often balk when the pragmatist 
Suggests that the t r u t h of a given idea c o n s i s t s i n i t s 
w o r k a b i l i t y . They seem to p r e f e r the r a t i o n a l i s t ' s p o s i t i o n . 
But as we have seen above the pragmatist holds that you can-
not separate the method and theory of t r u t h . I t s being a 
1. Pragmatism, p65. 
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method i s i n c i d e n t a l to i t s being a theory of t r u t h , and 
i s included i n i t . 
As we have noted above, pragmatism stands f o r no 
p a r t i c u l a r r e s u l t s . I t has no such m a t e r i a l i s t i c bias 
such as empiricism has. I t i s not u n f r i e n d l y to abstrac-
t i o n s as long as they work and are of use to us i n g e t t i n g 
about among p a r t i c u l a r s . Whenever they f a i l to do t h i s , 
however, they must be cast out. In f a c t pragmatism con-
s i d e r s any conception whatever as true, from whatever source 
i t may have o r i g i n a t e d , as long as i t meets the pragmatic 
c r i t e r i o n . Professor James recommends i t as a mediator 
between the two extreme temperaments i n philosophy, the 
'tough-minded' and the 'tender-minded', as he c a l l s them, 
or the e m p i r i c i s t and the r a t i o n a l i s t i c . 
In the f i e l d of r e l i g i o n , " I f t h e o l o g i c a l ideas 
prove to have a value f o r concrete l i f e , they w i l l be true 
f o r pragmatism i n the sense of being good f o r so much. For 
how much more they are true, w i l l depend e n t i r e l y upon 
t h e i r r e l a t i o n s to the other truths that also have to be 
acknowledged. n l 
Professor James even goes so f a r as to suggest 
that the Absolute i s true i n so f a r as i t meets the pragmatic 
c r i t e r i o n . But we must be very sure that we understand 
what we mean by c a l l i n g these conceptions true. The abso-
l u t e i d e a l i s t means a very d i f f e r e n t thing from what the 
1. Pragmatism, pV3. 
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pragmatist does when he makes the a s s e r t i o n , and the prag-
m a t i s t has a d e f i n i t e q u a r r e l w i t h him on t h i s very p o i n t . 
But as t h i s d i f f e r e n c e has already "been noted, we s h a l l not 
d i s c u s s i t f a r t h e r here. 
I I I . 
Before pragmatism had been f a i r l y stated, the 
c r i t i c s were out i n f u l l f o r c e , prepared to s t r i k e a death 
blow at the new movement at the f i r s t opportunity. I t i s 
always so. The c r i t i c l i k e the w a r r i o r seems to have a 
t h i r s t f o r s p o i l s ; he wants to tear something down; and too 
o f t e n he c r i t i c i z e s without having, and seemingly without 
attempting to get, even a f a i r understanding of the object 
of h i s c r i t i c i s m . H i s c r i t i c i s m then i s u n i n t e l l i g e n t , 
and he i s i n f a c t c r i t i c i z i n g nothing but a figment of h i s 
own imagination. So i t has been w i t h a l a r g e number of 
the c r i t i c s of pragmatism. They f a i l e d to get a true con-
c e p t i o n of the movement before beginning t h e i r attack. 
There i s bound to be a c e r t a i n amount of such un-
i n t e l l i g e n t c r i t i c i s m i n every case, but pragmatism f o r 
some reason or other seemed to get a double p o r t i o n . By 
t h i s time things are c l e a r i n g up considerably, however, 
and we are g e t t i n g some of the more v a l u a b l e s o r t , i n t e l l i -
gent c r i t i c i s m , that i s , that i n which the c r i t i c knows 
what he i s c r i t i c i z i n g . Yet there are some who i n s i s t on 
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misunderstanding and i n p u t t i n g t h e i r own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
on the pragmatic c r i t e r i o n , even a f t e r they have been de-
f i n i t e l y informed that pragmatism stands f o r nothing of the 
s o r t . Because of t h i s f a c t P r o f e s s o r James, toward whom 
most of the attacks are d i r e c t e d , has been kept busy up 
to the present time s t a t i n g what he meant. 
But l e t us take care that we do not i n our t u r n 
give the c r i t i c an unjust condemnation. I t i s true that 
the p n i l o s o p h i c a l p e r i o d i c a l s were crowded with much c r i t i -
cism that appears as mere s t u f f and r i d i c u l o u s i n the l i g h t 
of a f u l l and complete statement of pragmatism, which, how-
ever, the c r i t i c s d i d not have at hand when they wrote. 
Perhaps i t was p o s s i b l e only through these c r i t i c i s m s to 
get an accurate statement. There i s much to be s a i d on 
e i t h e r side. And i n defense of the c r i t i c s one may say 
that the f i r s t statements of pragmatism were ra t h e r vague 
and i n many places capable of a double i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I t i s 
impossible that i t should be otherwise i n the case of a 
movement having such wide s i g n i f i c a n c e ; and i t would be no 
d i s c r e d i t to the leader i f he should l a t e r make c e r t a i n 
m o d i f i c a t i o n s which he deemed necessary. Concept Ions of 
t h i s s o r t do not s p r i n g up i n a moment complete and accu-
r a t e l y s t a t e d , however, Professor James claims not to have 
changed h i s p o s i t i o n i n the l e a s t , and i n the l a s t r e s o r t 
we must of course go to him to f i n d what he meant by cer-
t a i n passages i n the e a r l y statement. 
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In view of t h i s we must conclude that the misun-
derstandings were due, f i r s t to the f a c t that i t was new 
to some - they were not i n the habit of consid e r i n g t h i n g s 
i n that l i g h t , and to do so required a readjustment; second, 
the statements were to some extent r e a l l y ambiguous, perhaps 
due to the f a c t that they were given by Professor James as 
popular l e c t u r e s and the f a c t that there was a l a c k of tech-
n i c a l terms i n t h e i r expression. Such terms as ' u s e f u l ' , 
' p r a c t i c a l 1 , 'working', e t c . , were not d e f i n i t e enough to 
express what was r e a l l y meant. In many places they could 
be i n t e r p r e t e d i n a way which the author never intended. 
' P r a c t i c a l ' has a host of meanings and shades of meaning, 
and i t i s safe to say that i t was given every i n t e r p r e t a -
t i o n p o s s i b l e by some c r i t i c or other. 
One group of c r i t i c s i n s i s t e d that pragmatism 
meant ' p r a c t i c a l i s m ' , since the word pragmatism i s derived 
from the 'îreek word \\^Cd^JWX meaning a c t i o n , and being the 
source from which our terms ' p r a c t i c e ' and ' p r a c t i c a l ' are 
der i v e d . They then proceeded to put t h e i r own i n t e r p r e t a -
t i o n on the word ' p r a c t i c a l ' , and developed f o r themselves 
the f o l l o w i n g conception of pragmatism. Lt i s a s o r t of 
make-shift philosophy for men of a c t i o n g e n e r a l l y , such as 
engineers, doctors, e t c . But i t i s not a r e a l and genuine 
philosophy. I t w i l l do i n many cases f o r a s u b s t i t u t e , but 
i t i s not the r e a l t h i n g . The ' p r a c t i c a l ' or ' u s e f u l ' c r i -
t e r i o n of t r u t h w i l l serve as a t e s t f o r t r u t h i n a ^ r e a t 
many cases, Tout by no means i n a l l . There are many t r u t h s 
t h a t are a b s o l u t e l y i m p r a c t i c a l and use l e s s to us. So i f 
we want a rough t e s t of t r u t h , something which we can apply 
i n a hurry, and something which i n the m a j o r i t y of cases 
w i l l serve our purpose, we s h a l l f i n d pragmatism h e l p f u l . 
I f we want a r e a l t e s t , however, we must look elsewhere. 
In the l i g h t of the preceding statement of prag-
matism, such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n appears r i d i c u l o u s ; and i t 
was p o s s i b l e only through a very narrow i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
the terms ' p r a c t i c a l ' and ' u s e f u l ' . The c r i t i c s took these 
terms to mean nothing more than making money, g e t t i n g pos-
session of more property, and s i m i l a r t h i n g s , which i s i n -
deed the popular conception of p r a c t i c a l . From the f a c t 
t h a t P r o f e s s o r James used such terms as 'cash-value', ' c r e d i 
system', and 'bank notes passing', they jumped to the con-
c l u s i o n that ' p r a c t i c a l ' and ' u s e f u l ' meant j u s t t h i s and 
nothing more. 
)3ut when the pragmatist speaks o f p r a c t i c a l d i f -
f erence', he means any d i f f e r e n c e whatever. The term 
' p r a c t i c a l ' might j u s t as w e l l have been omitted. The mean-
i n g would have been the same. In science there are many 
conceptions and t h e o r i e s that have been very u s e f u l (using 
the terra i n the narrow sense), while others have been use-
l e s s and i m p r a c t i c a l (using the term i n the same sense!' . 
But t h i s has nothing to do w i t h t h e i r t r u t h and f a l s i t y . 
We must use the term i n the broad sense - not merely u s e f u l 
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f o r accumulating wealth, f o r commercial or i n d u s t r i a l pur-
poses, hut us e f u l f o r the purpose of e x p l a i n i n g a l l the 
d-ita we have, f o r the purpose of reducing a l l experience 
data to a system, that we may he able to comprehend them and 
handle them b e t t e r , that by means of such a system we may 
be guided i n our future experience. Wot only the d i f f e r e n c e 
t h a t brings us an e x t r a l o a f of bread i s to be considered, 
but every d i f f e r e n c e . There i s no d i f f e r e n c e that i s n ' t 
a P r a o t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e , using the term ' p r a c t i c a l 1 i n the 
broad sense that the pragmatist does. And to speak of a d i f 
ference that produces no e f f e c t upon us i s f o l l y , senseless, 
mere speculation w i t h no foundation whatever. Thus pragma-
ti s m denies that i t makes p r a c t i c a l utilit}»- i n the narrow 
sense a c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h . The term must be used i n a 
S 
broad sense, and i t i s unfortunate that we have not another 
word f o r the idea to be expressed, a t e c h n i c a l term that 
could not be given such d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . 
Pragmatism has f u r t h e r been accused of being mere-
l y a restatement of some v a r i e t y of empiricism. Some of 
the c r i t i c s have termed i t a re-hash of p o s i t i v i s m . Others 
have considered i t as pure su b j e c t i v i s m with no balancing 
f a c t o r whatever. Thus the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s made by the c r i -
t i c s have by no means agreed, and many of them w i l l appear 
r i d i c u l o u s and i n a p p l i c a b l e i n the l i g h t of the preceding 
statement of pragmatism. In f a c t they have already been 
met i n t h i s statement. The very f a c t that these c r i t i c i s m s 
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were "before ua has perhaps made i t p o s s i b l e to give a c l e a r -
er and more accurate statement than would otherwise have 
been p o s s i b l e . Hence, i f the answers to some of these ob-
j e c t i o n s seem inadequate, the reader i s r e f e r r e d to the pre-
ceding s e c t i o n f o r f u r t h e r evidence. 
Pragmatism i s not merely a re-hash of p o s i t i v i s m . 
P o s i t i v i s m denies the p o s s i b i l i t y of knowledge of r e a l i t y 
i n i t s e l f . I t recognizes many problems, which i t considers 
i n s o l u b l e , while pragmatism considers these same problems 
absurd and devoid of sense. The p o s i t i v i s t ' s d e f i n i t i o n of 
t r u t h i s d i f f e r e n t from the pragmatist's d e f i n i t i o n , which 
has already been set f o r t h . Pragmatism does not give up, 
l a y down everything, and declare that we cannot a t t a i n to 
r e a l t r u t h , as p o s i t i v i s m does. On the other hand, i t de-
f i n e s what we mean by t r u t h , as we have already seen. 
Neither does i t i n s i s t that mere immediate f a c t s are a l l we 
can know, as empiricism i n i t s baldest form would a s s e r t . 
I t welcomes a b s t r a c t i o n s from any source whatever, f a n c i f u l 
hypotheses of any s o r t , e tc., so long as the f a c t s f i t i n t o 
them, and they work i n guiding us i n our experience, every 
phase of which must be taken i n t o c onsideration i f i t has 
any connection w i t h or any bearing on the a b s t r a c t i o n . 
Thus pragmatism takes the good p o i n t s of e m p i r i -
cism, the f a c t s , the data, and also the good p o i n t s of r a -
t i o n a l i s m , those a b s t r a c t i o n s which have backing. These i t 
u n i t e s i n i t s own way, and produces a theory of t r u t h that 
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i s f a r more acceptable than that of e i t h e r the extreme em-
p i r i c i s t or the r a t i o n a l i s t , since i t has eliminated the 
o b j e o t i o n a l features of each. Pragmatism wants both f a c t s 
and a b s t r a c t i o n s . I t i s very l i b e r a l , since i t w i l l take 
anything, so long as i t f u l f i l l s the proposed c r i t e r i o n . 
The charge of subjectivism too i s a f a l s e one, 
and might as w e l l have been d i r e c t e d toward the r a t i o n a l i s t 
as the pragmatist. I t r e s u l t e d from the f a c t that the 
term ' s a t i s f a c t i o n ' was used i n d e f i n i n g the pragmatic c r i -
t e r i o n of t r u t h , and i t s meaning was misinterpreted. S a t i s -
f a c t i o n i s i n i t s e l f a subjective c o n d i t i o n . Hence the 
c r i t i c s drew the rash conclusion that whatever idea a per-
son happened to fancy, no matter whether i t was substantiated 
by s u f f i c i e n t data or not, or i n f a c t whether there was any 
data whatever, - t h i s idea would be true f o r him. Nothing 
i s f a r t h e r from the pragmatist's r e a l a t t i t u d e . The s a t i s -
f a c t i o n i n question i s that which comes from a c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
o f a l l the data i n connection w i t h the idea. 
Professor James expressly denies that "whatever 
proves s u b j e c t i v e l y expedient i n the way of our t h i n k i n g i s 
true i n the absolute and u n r e s t r i c t e d sense of the word, 
whether i t corresponds to any o b j e c t i v e state of things out-
side of our thought or n o t . " 1 
i Le f u r t h e r a s s e r t s , "The object f o r me i s j u s t as 
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much one p a r t of r e a l i t y as the idea i s another p a r t . The 
t r u t h of an i d e a i s one r e l a t i o n of i t to the r e a l i t y , j u s t 
as i t s date and i t s place are other, r e l a t i o n s . A l l three 
r e l a t i o n s c o n s i s t of i n t e r v e n i n g p a r t s of the universe which 
can i n every p a r t i c u l a r case he assigned and catalogued, 
and which d i f f e r i n every instance of t r u t h , j u s t as they 
d i f f e r w i t h every date and p l a c e . The pragmatic t h e s i s ... 
i s that the r e l a t i o n c a l l e d t r u t h i s thus c o n c r e t e l y d e f i n -
a b l e . " 2 
I t i s p o s s i b l e to l e t our i n d i v i d u a l preferences, 
our r e s p e c t i v e temperaments, have f u l l sway only when we 
have two r i v a l conceptions or hypotheses, each of which meet 
the f a c t s . In such a case, as has already been shown, one 
i s as true as the other, and we are at l i b e r t y to choose the 
one that s u i t s our t a s t e . , This happens, however, compara-
t i v e l y seldom, and i s not the f i r s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n . F i r s t 
always, does i t f i t the data? This accusation i n v o l v e s the 
whole question of the place of temperament i n the t r u t h prob-
lem. As we have already treated i t above, however, we s h a l l 
not add more here. 
Descartes might as w e l l have been accused of such 
extreme s u b j e c t i v i s m f o r l a y i n g down 'clearness and d i s t i n c t -
ness* as a c r i t e r i o n of the t r u t h of ideas. P r o f e s s o r James 
uses the term 'luminousness' i n h i s " V a r i e t i e s of R e l i g i o u s 
1. J . of P h i l . , V o l . V, p691. 
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Expérience" to denote the same t h i n g , and t h i s would perhaps 
have been a b e t t e r term, since i t would be l e s s apt to be 
giv e n so many i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . 
About a year ago there appeared i n the J o u r n a l o f 
P h i l o s o p h y 1 a very i n t e r e s t i n g b i t of a n a l y s i s by Mr. Lovejoy. 
h i s a r t i c l e i s e n t i t l e d "The T h i r t e e n Pragmatisms", and he 
cl a i m s to have s i n g l e d out a dozen and one contentions which 
have been grouped together as pragmatism, but which are l o g i -
c a l l y independent, so that you may w i t h consistency accept 
any one of them and r e j e c t a l l the others. He d i v i d e s them 
i n t o three t h e o r i e s o f meaning, nine t h e o r i e s of knowledge 
each proposing a c r i t e r i o n of the v a l i d i t y of a judgment, 
and one o n t o l o g i c a l theory, making t h i r t e e n i n a l l . Upon 
examination, however, i t i s found that h i s a n a l y s i s i s not 
what he has claimed f o r i t , but that i t i s a mixture. I n 
p a r t i t i s composed of an a n a l y s i s of the elements of prag-
matism; i n p a r t an enumeration of confused misconceptions of 
what the pragmatic c r i t e r i o n i s . 
The problem of t r u t h cannot be considered without 
i n v o l v i n g the problem of meaning, and pragmatism does not 
c l a i m to be l i m i t e d to meaning. I t i s a theory of t r u t h . 
I t s t a t e s i t s c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h , and then proceeds to ex-
p l a i n i n d e t a i l what i t means by the c r i t e r i o n . I f i n t h i s 
e x p l a n a t i o n there appear c e r t a i n contentions that are con-
1. J . o f P h i l . , VOL. V, 2 
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neoted w i t h the problem - and i t i s impossible that i t should 
be otherwise - w e l l and good, so long as they are necessary 
and are l o g i c a l l y connected. But there i s no reason why one 
of these should be considered the sum and substance of prag-
matism. This i s absurd. Nevertheless, as Mr. Lovejoy sug-
g e s t s , i t i s about time f o r pragmatism to be c l e a r i n g up, 
f o r contemporary philosophers at l e a s t to understand what 
pragmatism i s and to attach a s i n g l e meaning to the term; 
and t h i s a n a l j ^ s i s , though f a u l t y i n many ways, has a s s i s t e d 
i n t h i s clearing-up process. 
A f t e r a l l these matters have been c l e a r e d up, and 
everybody understands what pragmatism means and what i t s 
o r i t e r i o n of t r u t h i s , s t i l l there i s a b a t t l e on. And i t 
i s between r a t i o n a l i s m and pragmatism, each understanding 
the p o s i t i o n of the other. This i s the r a t i o n a l i s t ' s a t t a c k . 
Pragmatism e x p l a i n s not what t r u t h i s , but only how i t i s 
a r r i v e d at. There i s a d i s t i n c t i o n between the t r u t h of an 
id e a and the proof that i t i s t r u e . An idea may be true and 
yet be beyond proof by our human experience. Mr. R u s s e l l 
i n h i s controversy w i t h Professor James 1, i n which there i s 
a very c l e a r statement of the re s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s of the 
r a t i o n a l i s t and the pragmatist, i s d r i v e n to i n c l u d e t h i s 
i n h i s p o s i t i o n . Truth stands i n a transcendental r e l a t i o n , 
and may i n some cases make no e m p i r i c a l d i f f e r e n c e to us 
1. J . of P h i l . , V o l . IV, 11. 
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whatever. # I t i s merely agreement w i t h r e a l i t y , and r e a l i t y 
i s complete and ready-made from a l l e t e r n i t y . 
The pragmatist too accepts the d e f i n i t i o n that 
t r u t h i s agreement w i t h r e a l i t y , hut he goes on to define 
what he means "by r e a l i t y and by such agreement, as we have a l -
ready shown. He then challenges the r a t i o n a l i s t to state 
what he means by the d e f i n i t i o n ; but the r a t i o n a l i s t refuses 
to e x p l a i n i t , the vaguer the better f o r him. Hence, the prag-
ma t i s t claims that he and he only has offered a c r i t e r i o n 
of t r u t h . The f a l l a c y of the r a t i o n a l i s t here as elsewhere 
has been to get an a b s t r a c t i o n from the p a r t i c u l a r s of ex-
perience, and straightway confer upon such abstraction a 
transcendental s i g n i f i c a n c e which i t does not merit. He 
denies the source and o r i g i n of the ab s t r a c t i o n . 
Professor James' i l l u s t r a t i o n w i l l make t h i s c l e a r -
er. Wealth, h e a l t h , strength, t r u t h , and such abstractions 
a l l come i n the same c l a s s . We recognize at once that wealth 
i s only a name f o r c e r t a i n concrete processes i n which the 
l i v e s of some men are involved. I t i s nothing i n the man 
R o c k e f e l l e r , but not i n us. So i t i s w i t h health. I t i s 
merely a name f o r processes that go on, good d i g e s t i o n , e t c . 
Strength too, i s only a name f o r c e r t a i n processes that go 
on, l i f t i n g heavy weights, e tc. These terms have been ab-
s t r a c t e d from the p a r t i c u l a r s of experience, and they have 
no meaning beyond such p a r t i c u l a r s . I t i s ex a c t l y the same 
w i t h t r u t h . Truth i s also an a b s t r a c t i o n , a name f o r v e r i -
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f i c r a t i o n processes, f o r ideas that work. But the r a t i o n a l i s t , 
true to h i s custom, d e i f i e s the a b s t r a c t i o n and e n t i r e l y 
f o r g e t s i t s o r i g i n . In f a c t he denies such o r i g i n . 
The p o s i t i o n s of the pragmatist and the r a t i o n a l -
i s t r e s p e c t i v e l y i s very c l e a r l y brought out i n Professor 
James' l a s t l e t t e r to Mr. R u s s e l l . He says, "According to 
me, 'meaning' a c e r t a i n object and 'agreeing' with i t are 
abs t r a c t notions of both of which d e f i n i t e concrete accounts 
can be given. According to you, they shine by t h e i r own i n -
ner l i g h t and no f u r t h e r account can be given. They may 
even'obtain' ( i n cases where human v e r i f i c a t i o n i s impossi-
ble) and make no e m p i r i c a l difference to us. To me, using 
the pragmatic method of t e s t i n g concepts, t h i s would mean 
that the word t r u t h might on c e r t a i n occasions have no 
meaning whatever. I s t i l l must hold to i t s having always a 
meaning, and continue to contend f o r that meaning being un-
f o l d a b l e and representable i n e x p e r i e n t i a l terms." 1 
We now come to the most important of the c r i t i -
cisms, and one which deserves the most c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
i n order that a p e r f e c t l y c l e a r statement can be made. 
Just what do the pragmatists mean by ' p r a c t i c a l ' , ' u s e f u l ' , 
etc.? We have shown that the c r i t i c s were wrong i n suppos-
criterion 
ing that the pragmatic Acould be taken i n the ordinary nar-
row sense. I t i s true that t r u t h does very often correspond 
to p r a c t i c a l consequences i n t h i s narrow seflse, but not a l -
1. J . of P h i l . , V o l . IV, 11. 
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ways. There are p l e n t y of exceptions. The f a c t that there 
does seen to be a correspondence i n so many cases l e d the 
c r i t i c s to suppose that t h i s was the c r i t e r i o n proposed. 
But the pragmatists do not propose any such thing as a c r i -
t e r i o n of t r u t h . They do, however, have an explanation f o r 
the f a c t . I t i s because these extremely p r a c t i c a l conséquences 
are more u s e f u l to us i n everyday a f f a i r s . Hence we are 
more f a m i l i a r with them. Other differences and consequences 
have e x a c t l y the same r i g h t to be recognized and considered, 
but they are not so relevant to our common ordinary purposes 
as the others are. We don't need them as badly as we do the 
extremely p r a c t i c a l . Many truths have l i t t l e value to us 
p r a c t i c a l l y , i n the narrow sense again. But the reason why 
most of our stock of t r u t h s are extremely p r a c t i c a l i s be-
cause the f i e l d s i n which men search f o r t r u t h are determined 
by t h e i r d e s i r e s , t h e i r b e l i e f s , etc., and oftener lead to 
very p r a c t i c a l t r u t h than otherwise. 
We know that delusions have often been very u s e f u l , 
and have worked f o r the good of the subject. They have been 
used often as a means to s o c i a l progress. There are many 
cases where a person does not want to know the t r u t h . He 
courts ignorance, and turns h i s back on anything that looks 
l i k e a search f o r t r u t h . 
I f a woman's c h i l d had commited s u i c i d e , the wo-
man, i f she be l i k e most of us, would rather not know the 
t r u t h . She would p r e f e r to be deceived and made to b e l i e v e 
42. 
that the death was caused by an accident. Such deception 
has o f t e n proved u s e f u l i n keeping the subject from despair, 
morbid c o n d i t i o n s , i n s a n i t y , and perhaps death, when the 
t r u t h about the s i t u a t i o n would have brought about the above-
mentioned c o n d i t i o n s . The subject was not allowed the data 
by which to determine the t r u t h concerning the s i t u a t i o n , 
but the data were there. They were kept from her purposely, 
and she made no attempt at v e r i f i c a t i o n . There was undoubted-
l y a good accruing from her b e l i e f i n a f a l s e idea, and the 
true i d e a would have worked e v i l , not good. 
One more example might be given. A man i s going 
to a theater to see a p l a y . He le a r n s through a f r i e n d that 
the p l a y has been postponed on account of the, i l l n e s s of the 
l e a d i n g a c t o r . The r e s u l t i s that he spends the evening at 
home i n s t e a d of at the theater as he had a n t i c i p a t e d . On 
reading the paper the f o l l o w i n g morning he learns that the 
p l a y has been given. During i t the theater caught f i r e , and 
the r e s u l t was d i s a s t r o u s . Many were k i l l e d i n t r y i n g to 
escape, and s c a r c e l y anyone escaped without i n j u r y . Now 
t h i s f a l s e i u u a vnich our man had was u s e f u l to him, because 
i t kept him away from the theater and perhaps saved h i s l i f e . 
The true i d e a would have been harmful. 
We might continue to m u l t i p l y instances, but these 
are enough to serve our purpose. I t seems to me necessary 
f o r trie pragmatist to define h i s c r i t e r i o n a c c u r a t e l y , and 
to l i m i t i t so that these cases w i l l not be included. And 
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I t h i n k i t can he done, although the l i m i t has been a l i t t l e 
too hazy heretofore, to judge from the c r i tics»attacks. 
Here i s the po i n t to "be considered. Long ago P l a t o 
represented Socrates as saying that i f a thing i s good, i t 
m u 8 t  h e
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 ÎSS. something. Just so i f a thing i s u s e f u l , 
i t i s u s e f u l f o r some purpose, and i n the problem of t r u t h 
that purpose i s p r i m a r i l y v e r i f i c a t i o n , or i n other words 
sy s t e m a t i z a t i o n of our data. And as we have said before, 
i t i s not an i n d i v i d u a l a f f a i r . Truth i s s o c i a l , and one 
i n d i v i d u a l does not have a l l the data that i t i s p o s s i b l e 
f o r us to get, e l s e he would be more than human and h i s 
knowledge would represent that a b s t r a c t i o n the r a t i o n a l i s t 
worships, the Truth w i t h a c a p i t a l T. 
I f a person l i m i t s h i s data, makes no attempt to 
get a l l the data he can, h i s conclusions cannot of course 
be considered as true. There i s a great d i f f e r e n c e between 
the r e s u l t s of b e l i e v i n g i n an idea without making any at-
tempts to v e r i f y i t , i . e . l i m i t i n g your data and neglecting 
to f i t what you have i n t o the idea to see whether i t w i l l 
work, and the r e s u l t s of b e l i e v i n g i n an idea i n the scie n -
t i f i c way, f i t t i n g your data i n t o i t to see whether they 
w i l l work, making every e f f o r t to v e r i f y t t , i n short using 
i t as an hypothesis. The f i r s t of these I s h a l l c a l l b l i n d 
f a i t h , and i t has no place i n the determination of t r u t h 
and e r r o r . The second I s h a l l c a l l s c i e n t i f i c f a i t h , and 
i t i s the r e a l t e s t . The question i s ' i s i t u s e f u l f o r v e r i -
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f i c a t i o n ? ' a s the term has been defined i n the preceding sec-
t i o n , not ' i s i t u s e f u l f o r some side i s s u e ? 1 
P r o f e s s o r James has been accused - and I think 
there i s some ground f o r the accusation - of f a i l i n g to make 
t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , or at l e a s t of f a i l i n g to make i t c l e a r 
and d e f i n i t e . There are passages i n h i s w r i t i n g s i n which 
he seems to include consequences of the b e l i e f i n an idea, 
or what I have c a l l e d b l i n d f a i t h , i n the c r i t e r i o n . He 
may not mean to do anything of the s o r t . Nevertheless the 
ambiguity i s there, and there i s opportunity f o r misunder-
standing. The d i s t i n c t i o n between b l i n d f a i t h and scien-
t i f i c f a i t h has not been c l e a r l y stated, and seemingly not 
adhered to i n some cases. This i s not i c a b l e i n the t r e a t -
ment of r e l i g i o u s ideas. 
For example i n considering the question of design 
i n nature P r o f e s s o r James says, "Pragmatically .... the ab-
s t r a c t word*design' i s a blank c a r t r i d g e . I t c a r r i e s no 
consequences, i t does no execution. What design? and what 
designer? are the only serious questions, and the study of 
f a c t s i s the only way of g e t t i n g even approximate answers." 1 
But he goes on to say, "Meanwhile, pending the 
slow answer from f a c t s , anyone who i n s i s t s that there i s 
a designer and i s sure he i s a d i v i n e one, gets a c e r t a i n 
pragmatic b e n e f i t from the term 'Design', worthless tho 
1. Pragmatism, p!14 
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i t be as a mere r a t i o n a l i s t i c p r i n c i p l e set above or behind 
things f o r our admiration, becomes, i f our f a i t h concretes 
i t i n t o something t h e i s t i c , a term of promise. Returning 
w i t h i t i n t o experience, we gain a more confiding outlook 
on the f u t u r e . " 1 
Now i t seems to me that t h i s l a t t e r statement re-
f e r s d i r e c t l y to b l i n d f a i t h , the r e s u l t s of b e l i e f i n a 
c e r t a i n idea; and as such i t cannot be considered a c r i t e r i o n 
o f t r u t h . In considering r e l i g i o u s ideas e s p e c i a l l y should 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between b l i n d and s c i e n t i f i c f a i t h be made 
c l e a r , f o r i t i s here that men are l e a s t apt to tes t t h e i r 
conceptions. There i s a very large number of men who accept 
t h e i r r e l i g i o u s ideas ready-made. They never even inspect 
them, or stop to consider what they mean or whether there 
i s any b a s i s f o r t h e i r holding such ideas. Such cases are 
cases of b l i n d f a i t h , and the r e s u l t s may be, and indeed 
have "been i n many cases , good and extremely u s e f u l . But 
t h i s i s not a t e s t of the t r u t h of r e l i g i o u s ideas. In the 
above cases r e l i g i o n i s nothing more than a s u p e r s t i t i o n , 
a b l i n d p r e j u d i c e , perhaps a delusion which i n t h i s case 
has good r e s u l t s . But r e l i g i o n i s more than that, and we 
could never be s a t i s f i e d w i t h any such a treatment of i t . 
Do not understand that I am c r i t i c i z i n g r e l i g i o n , for such 
i s f a r from my purpose. I have only shown that i n t h i s f i e l d 
1. Pragmatism, p!14. 
46. 
as i n every other we must be on our guard to exclude from 
our c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h those good consequences which are the 
r e s u l t merely of the b e l i e f i n c e r t a i n conceptions, or i n 
mere b l i n d f a i t h . By f o l l o w i n g t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between 
b l i n d and s c i e n t i f i c f a i t h i t w i l l be p o s s i b l e , I think, to 
c l e a r up the question as to what pragmatism means, and to 
st a t e the c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h so that i t w i l l be much more 
c l e a r l y understood. 
Mr. Dewey's break with pragmatism as a movement 
was caused by t h i s same vagueness concerning the meaning of 
' p r a c t i c a l ' as used by the'pragraatists. I r e f e r the reader 
1 
to h i s a r t i c l e , "What Does Pragmatism Mean by P r a c t i c a l " , 
i n which he shows the need of a d e f i n i t e statement of what 
• p r a c t i c a l ' as used means, discusses some points of d i f f e r e n c e 
between h i s p o s i t i o n and that of Professor James, and ends 
"by suggesting that h i s name be not connected w i t h the move-
ment of pragmatism, and that each man pursue h i s work i n 
h i s own way and be responsible f o r i t alone. I s h a l l quote 
h i s c l o s i n g paragraph; 
"As f o r the t h i n g pragmatism, moreover, Mr. James 
has performed so uniquely the composing of d i f f e r e n t e l e -
ments i n t o a s i n g l e p i c t o r i a l or a r t i s t i c whole, that i t i s 
probable that progress i n the immediate future w i l l come 
from a more a n a l y t i c c l e a r i n g up and development of these 
1. J . of P h i l . , V o l . V, 4 
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independent elements. I t w i l l then he possible to pass upon 
t h e i r d i f f e r e n t i a l t r a i t s , and the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e i r con-
s i s t e n t , l o g i c a l combination. After a period of pools and 
mergers, the tendency i s to return to the advantages of i n -
d i v i d u a l e f f o r t and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . P o s s i b l y 'pragmatism' 
as a holding company f o r a l l i e d , yet separate i n t e r e s t s and 
problems, might be dissolved and revert to i t s o r i g i n a l con-
s t i t u e n t s . * 
To my mind there has been a change, a development 
i n the pragmatic c r i t e r i o n . The pragmatists have been forced 
by the attacks of the c r i t i c s to throw out mere u t i l i t y as 
an element i n the c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h . There are numerous 
examples of passages w r i t t e n by the leaders, which can hard-
l y be construed so as to mean anything other than usefulness 
or u t i l i t y as a c r i t e r i o n . For example: "The true i s the 
name of whatever proves i t s e l f to be good i n the way of be-
l i e f , and good, too, f o r d e f i n i t e assignable reasons. h 1~ 
"What would be better f o r us to believe! This 
sounds very l i k e a d e f i n i t i o n of t r u t h . I t comes very near 
to saying 'what we ought to believe': and in that d e f i n i -
t i o n none of you would f i n d any o d d i t y . " 2 
"An idea i s 'true' so long as to believe i t i s 
p r o f i t a b l e to our l i v e s . " 3 
1. J . of P h i l . , Vol. V, 4. 
1-. Pragmatism, p76. 
2. " p77. 
3. " p75. 
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This i n d i c a t e s that the c r i t e r i o n was i n d e f i n i t e 
and vague, that i t s l i m i t s were not c l e a r l y defined. I t 
would he i n t e r e s t i n g to trace i n d e t a i l t h i s development or 
e v o l u t i o n of pragmatism. This I have not attempted to do 
i n any accurate way. I have only endeavored to give, i n the 
f i r s t p a rt a short h i s t o r i c a l sketch; i n the second part a 
statement of the present status of pragmatism, i . e . , a s t a t e -
ment of what pragmatism i s now, not what i t was at i t s be-
gi n n i n g or at the d i f f e r e n t stages of i t s development; and 
f i n a l l y i n t h i s , the t h i r d p a r t , a summary of the c r i t i c i s m s 
brought against i t . 
But Professor James denies that there has been any 
change i n the pragmatic c r i t e r i o n . I t c e r t a i n l y appears that 
there has been a change as one reviews the l i t e r a t u r e on 
the s u b j e c t . A l l that can be s a i d , however, i s that even 
i f there has been no change i n pragmatism to the leaders 
themselves, there c e r t a i n l y has been a d i s t i n c t development 
or e v o l u t i o n i n the movement to those o u t s i d e r s who were 
l o o k i n g on, who d i d not get to view the inner workings, so 
to speak, but had to judge only from outward appearances. 
I t i s not worth w h i l e , however, to quibble over t h i s p o i n t . 
What we are i n t e r e s t e d i n i s the f i n i s h e d product. What does 
pragmatism stand f o r now? And i t i s c l e a r to everyone that 
mere u t i l i t y w i l l not serve as a c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h . 
So much f o r the c r i t i c i s m s that have been heaped 
upon pragmatism. In c l o s i n g t h i s s e c t i o n l e t us note again 
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t h a t pragmatism does not stand f o r any p a r t i c u l a r r e s u l t s . 
As most 1 isms' i t must he general, and i t proposes f i r s t , 
l a s t , and a l l the time to he a theory of t r u t h . As pragma-
t i s m , i t has nothing to do w i t h the s p e c i a l r e s u l t s that we 
may get from the a p p l i c a t i o n of the c r i t e r i o n . I t does not 
c l a i m that through such a p p l i c a t i o n men w i l l i n v a r i a b l y ar-
r i v e at the same conclusions. I t w i l l not produce a u n i -
v e r s a l l y accepted philosophy, hut i t w i l l e liminate many of 
the c o n t r o v e r s i e s of the present time. Disagreements w i l l 
r e s u l t then as now; hut there w i l l he fewer of them, since 
men w i l l have a c l e a r e r conception of what t r u t h i s and what 
i s i n v o l v e d i n t h e i r disagreement. 
Much of the adverse c r i t i c i s m d i r e c t e d against 
P r o f e s s o r James i s not c r i t i c i s m of pragmatism, hut of h i s 
s p e c i a l a p p l i c a t i o n of i t to c e r t a i n f i e l d s , e.g. to r e l i -
g i o n . Now we can never hope that a l l men w i l l agree con-
c e r n i n g many questions at i s s u e . Hence i t would he f o l l y 
to t r y to make the term pragmatism cover a l l the a p p l i c a -
t i o n s o f i t that men make to the many f i e l d s of i n q u i r y , 
and no one but the c r i t i c s have t r i e d to do so. I t would 
be e q u i v a l e n t to making i t equal the whole system of p h i l o s o -
phy o f P r o f e s s o r James, p l u s that of Mr. S c h i l l e r , p l u s that 
of every other man who considers himself a pragmatist. This 
i s absurd, and i s merely another i l l u s t r a t i o n of the r e s u l t 
o f the a c t i v i t y of the c r i t i c who doesn't know what he i s 
c r i t i c i z i n g . I f Professor James has f a i l e d to d i s t i n g u i s h 
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c l e a r l y between what pragmatism i t s e l f i s and h i s a p p l i c a -
t i o n s of i t to c e r t a i n f i e l d s , i t i s high time that t h i s be 
pointed out to the c r i t i c s , f o r I am sure that he intends 
that there be a d i s t i n c t i o n . When t h i s f a c t i s thoroughly 
recognized, there w i l l doubtless be more adherents and l e s s 
o p p o s i t i o n to the movement. 
IV. 
The l a s t question that remains to be answered 
according to our pre-arranged plan i s what are the perma-
nent elements i n pragmatism, what i s to be the outcome of 
a l l t h i s s t i r about t r u t h that we have been experiencing 
i n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l world? F i r s t , there i s no doubt about 
the f a c t that the movement has been of very great value to 
philosophy i n c r e a t i n g a keen and l i v e i n t e r e s t i n the prob-
lem o f t r u t h , one of the most fundamental of p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
problems. There has been much serious and valuable discus-
s i o n by which the p a r t i c i p a n t s have become conscious of t h e i r 
own p o s i t i o n , which had formerly been very hazy and vague. 
Others found i t necessary to remodel t h e i r o l d views. Thus 
even though pragmatism has not succeeded i n converting a l l 
t h i n k e r s to her way of t h i n k i n g - and i t would be i n c r e d i -
ble to expect such an occurrence - she has influenced a l l 
by b r i n g i n g about a c a r e f u l and c r i t i c a l consideration of 
the problem of t r u t h . 
Philosophy i s not i n an i d e a l condition at the 
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present time. I t needs a cleaning up, and pragmatism thinks 
she can help i n the process. There are too many metaphysi-
c a l f l i g h t s that go beyond a l l signs of human l i f e and human 
experience. There seems to be no connection whatever. Now, 
philosophy, i f i t i s to have any meaning for us whatever, 
must not be divorced from l i f e . Hence,pragmatism r e v o l t s 
against such abstract systems which have no basis f o r t h e i r 
a b s t r a c t i o n s . She w i l l s t i r up the thinkers who hold such 
views to a c r i t i c a l consideration of what i t a l l means any-
way. Thus she w i l l make #them more c a r e f u l , and w i l l perhaps 
i n f l u e n c e them to root out some of the worst parts i n t h e i r 
systems. Gradually then philosophy w i l l become more exact 
and deserve a higher place. Now men of science look askance 
at i t , merely because of the f a c t that i t contains these 
systems that are divorced from l i f e and have no meaning. 
But t h i s c o n d i t i o n , pragmatism i n s i s t s , must be changed, 
g r a d u a l l y perhaps, but nevertheless changed. I f you can't 
convert the r a d i c a l r a t i o n a l i s t , you can at l e a s t bring forces 
to bear upon him so that he w i l l remodel h i s p o s i t i o n to 
some extent, and cast out whatever i s obviously i r r e l e v a n t . 
The future of pragmatism, now that i t i s becoming 
more c l e a r l y understood what i t r e a l l y i s , appears very 
b r i g h t . Up to the present time the discussion has been a l -
most e n t i r e l y general i n character, aiming at a statement 
of what pragmatism i s ; and i t n e c e s s a r i l y had to be so. As 
soon as t h i s matter i s cleared up, however, we may look f o r 
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a l a r g e amount of a p p l i e d pragmatism. Indeed the movement 
has begun already. Our t h i n k e r s w i l l apply i t to c e r t a i n 
d e f i n i t e problems. In i t s a p p l i c a t i o n i t w i l l become c l e a r -
er what.the proposed c r i t e r i o n i s , and i t i s safe to p r e d i c t 
t h a t i t w i l l not be long u n t i l men w i l l not be able to p l e a d 
ignorance of what pragmatism means. Through use we s h a l l 
become acquainted w i t h i t and see how i t works i n the d i f -
f e r e n t f i e l d s . 
There are many now who are prejudiced against i t , 
merely because they are not accustomed to i t . They have 
been brought up on something d i f f e r e n t , and are l o a t h to 
change. I t i s always so. Any new theory i s f i r s t r i d i c u l e d 
and declared worthless and i n s i g n i f i c a n t . Pragmatism has 
not escaped t h i s . But i n another generation, a f t e r t h i s 
p r e j u d i c e has passed away, and pragmatism has had an oppor-
t u n i t y to show how i t works on a l l s o r t s of problems, wa 
may expect a r e v e r s a l of the s i t u a t i o n , i n which importance 
and p r e s t i g e w i l l take the place of r i d i c u l e . 

